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THROUGH CORPORATE TAX HIKES CAN BE 
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE PROVINCES†
Ergete Ferede‡ and Bev Dahlby*
SUMMARY
Raising taxes can come at a serious cost. Not just to the taxpayer, of course, but to the economy. 
Every tax hike naturally leads people or companies to reallocate resources in ways that are less 
productive, resulting in a loss of income-generating opportunities. At a certain point, raising taxes 
becomes manifestly counterproductive, with the revenue lost due to the negative economic effects 
outweighing any tax gains. In cases like that, a government would actually raise more money by 
lowering taxes, broadening the tax base, than it does by increasing taxes.
In fact, an analysis of the tax-base elasticities of the provinces, using data from 1972 to 2010, reveals 
that this very phenomenon is what occurred in Saskatchewan, which raised corporate taxes to a point 
where it began to backfire, sabotaging the government’s goal of raising more revenue. It also occurred 
in New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, P.E.I., and Nova Scotia. In all these provinces, tax 
increases on corporate earnings actually ended up yielding less for the provinces than the provincial 
governments would have collected had they instead lowered corporate income taxes. 
In five other provinces, governments undermined their own provincial economies over the same 
period, raising corporate taxes when they would have been better off actually cutting the corporate 
income tax, and making up the difference with a revenue-neutral sales tax. Alberta, Ontario, British 
Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec all paid dearly for the decision to hit corporations with higher taxes, 
by sacrificing what could have been significant welfare gains had they sought to raise the same amount 
of revenue through higher sales taxes (or in the case of Alberta, a new sales tax). Quebec, at least, has 
lower tax-base elasticity than the others, however, possibly due to its unique cultural and linguistic 
characteristics, which may make it somewhat less likely for people and investors to leave the province. 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that corporate income taxes are far more sensitive to changes in 
the provincial tax rate than are personal income taxes or general sales taxes. Of course, it is not hard to 
see why politicians may feel political pressure to raise taxes on corporations, who do not vote, rather 
than passing tax increases onto residents, who do. But, while taxing corporations may be popular, 
preferred both by the voters and the politicians, when creating greater economic opportunities for 
their residents,  provinces would have been far better off, over the measured 38-year period, looking 
elsewhere for additional revenue. As politically contentious as it may be, that means going easier on 
corporations and instead raising personal income and sales taxes.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate changes is at the heart of academic and political 
debates surrounding the economic effects of taxes. Taxes influence labour supply, saving, 
investment, and other important economic decisions of the private sector. As a result, 
when governments increase tax rates in an attempt to raise more tax revenue, the resulting 
changes in the allocation of resources cause efficiency losses for the economy. This 
efficiency cost of tax rate changes can be nicely summarized with the marginal cost of 
public funds (MCF)—a measure of the loss incurred by a society in raising an additional 
dollar of tax revenue. The efficiency loss from the reallocation of resources caused by tax 
rate increases is directly related to the responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate changes. 
Consequently, tax-base elasticity—the responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate changes—has 
a central importance in tax-policy discussions and analyses. 
The revenue and economic effects of tax rate changes greatly depend on how the various 
tax bases respond to tax rate changes. A number of previous studies examine the 
behavioural responses of tax bases to tax rate changes. The empirical methodology used 
varies across studies and most of these studies focus on the estimation of the elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one minus the tax rate). An excellent 
survey of the earlier literature on the elasticity of taxable income is given by Saez, Slemrod, 
and Giertz.1 The majority of the studies also rely on individual U.S. household-tax-return 
data. Some of these studies such as Lindsey,2 and Feldstein,3 obtain taxable-income 
elasticities in excess of one. However, more recent studies such as Auten and Carroll,4 
Long,5 Kopczuk,6 Gruber and Saez,7 and Giertz8 find that the taxable-income response 
is much lower than one. Using tax-returns data from Canadian households, Sillamaa and 
Veall9 also find an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate close 
to 0.25 for working-age individuals. Milligan and Smart10 also estimate the elasticity of 
reported personal income to tax rate changes by exploiting subnational variation across 
Canadian provinces as their main identification strategy. They find that the elasticity is 
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2high for those people in the top one percentile of the income distribution and small for 
other income groups. Their results also suggest that both earned and capital income are 
responsive to tax rate changes.
Another strand of the empirical literature focuses on the responsiveness of the corporate-
income-tax base to tax rate changes. These studies include Mintz and Smart11 for Canada, 
Gruber and Rauh12 for the United States, Huizinga and Laeven13 for European countries, 
and Riedl and Rocha-Akis14 for OECD countries. These studies find high responsiveness of 
the corporate-income-tax base to tax rate changes. 
In a previous study,15 we employ panel data analysis to estimate tax-base elasticities for 
all Canadian provinces for their three major sources of tax revenue: corporate income tax 
(CIT), personal income tax (PIT) and provincial general sales tax (PST). We find that one-
percentage-point increases in corporate-income-, personal income-, and sales-tax rates were 
associated with short-run reductions in their respective tax bases of 3.67, 0.76, and 1.17 per 
cent. The corresponding long-run tax-base-elasticity estimates are much higher. We also 
use the elasticity estimates to compute the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) for each of 
these taxes for each province based on the tax rates and tax-revenue shares of the tax bases, 
which vary over time and across provinces. We find that the corporate income tax has the 
highest MCF and sales tax has the lowest MCF in all provinces. 
MCF computations in the previous study relied on the use of tax-base-elasticity estimates 
that were common to all the provinces. In this paper, however, we focus on investigating 
province-specific responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate changes. One would expect 
tax-base-elasticity estimates to differ across provinces due to various province-specific 
characteristics that change over time. First, some models of tax competition such as Kanbur 
and Keen16 suggest that small provinces may have more elastic tax bases than do large 
provinces. But the relative size of provinces can change over time.17 Second, variations 
in the socio-cultural makeup of provinces may influence tax-base mobility. For instance, 
the personal income tax base in Quebec, where the mother tongue of the majority of the 
population is French, may be lower than in other provinces if the francophone population 
is less likely to move from Quebec in response to higher tax rates.18 Third, the sensitivity 
11 
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3of tax bases to tax rate changes may well depend on the industrial mix of provinces, which 
obviously changes across time periods and provinces due to structural changes in the 
various sectors. For these and other reasons it is important to obtain province-specific tax-
base-elasticity estimates so that relatively more precise estimates of the effects of provincial 
tax-policy changes can be provided. 
The main objective of this paper is to provide province-specific long-run tax-base semi-
elasticity estimates for the three major tax categories: corporate income, personal income, 
and sales taxes, using provincial annual time-series data over the period 1972–2010. We 
focus on the long-run tax-base-elasticity estimates because tax-policy discussions and 
debates usually focus on the long-run effects of tax rate changes. To obtain the tax-base-
elasticity estimates, we employ the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) estimation 
method proposed by Stock and Watson.19 This estimation method performs better than 
other competing methods in small sample studies such as ours as it has superior small-
sample properties. For this reason, previous studies such as Sobel and Holcombe,20 
Schaller,21 and Bruce, Deskins and Fox22 employ a similar method. Another important 
contribution of our paper is that we use the province-specific tax-base semi-elasticity 
estimates to compute MCF measures for the three taxes for all provinces for the years up 
to 2013. We believe the MCF estimates obtained through such a procedure will provide 
better insights into the economic costs of taxes and contribute towards Canadian tax-policy 
discussions and analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts 
to measure the long-run tax-base responsiveness to tax rate changes for individual Canadian 
provinces.
Our results suggest that the corporate-income-tax base shows the most responsiveness 
to tax rate changes. The estimated corporate-income-tax base’s own semi-elasticity 
estimates range from –6.08 for Quebec to –17.56 for New Brunswick. The own semi-
elasticity estimate for the personal income tax base varies from –2.62 for Quebec to –4.42 
for British Columbia. We also obtain general-sales-tax-base semi-elasticity estimates for 
seven provinces, and those range from about –3.65 for Manitoba to –5.90 for Prince Edward 
Island. 
We use the province-specific long-run tax-base-elasticity estimates to compute the MCF 
for the three taxes for all provinces. The results indicate that there have been significant 
variations in the MCF during the period under investigation due to changes in tax rates 
and tax-revenue shares. We find that corporate and personal income taxes have higher 
MCF than does sales tax. Our results also indicate that, in 2013, the MCF for corporate 
income tax was the highest and the MCF for sales tax was the lowest for all provinces 
except Ontario. The MCF estimates for corporate income tax range from 2.91 for Alberta 
to 5.21 for Ontario in 2013. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies, which 
19 
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Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4have indicated that there is a very high economic cost associated with raising tax revenue 
through increases in the corporate income tax.
An important policy implication of our findings is that there would have been significant 
welfare gains in 2013 from a reduction in the CIT rate with a revenue-neutral switch to 
higher sales tax rates in British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. We also 
find that a CIT-rate reduction would have increased tax revenue in the Atlantic provinces 
and Saskatchewan—i.e. these provinces were on the negatively sloped section of their long-
run Laffer curves with respect to corporate-income-tax rates. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the 
empirical model, discuss the methodology, and describe the data used in our analysis. 
The econometric results are presented and discussed in Section 3. Our framework for 
calculating the MCF using our estimated tax-base semi-elasticities is described in Section 
4, along with the computations of the provinces’ MCF for the three major taxes. Section 5 
concludes.
2. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1. Econometric specification
Our main objective is to estimate the responsiveness of tax bases to tax rates for the three 
main taxes that are levied by the provincial governments in Canada: the corporate income 
tax (c), personal income tax (p), and general sales tax (s). As is common in previous studies, 
the basic empirical model can be specified as:
 
 (1)
where j = c, p, s. In Equation (1),  jtBln  is the log of tax base j in year t, and τjt is the 
corresponding provincial statutory tax rate. X includes a vector of various control variables. 
Using annual provincial data, Equation (1) will be estimated for each province and for each 
tax category separately. The coefficients of interest in Equation (1) are ε
ji,
 which show the 
percentage response of the tax base j due to a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate 
i. We expect the own semi-elasticity estimates, εjj, to be negative, implying that an increase 
in the statutory tax rate reduces its corresponding tax base due to possible tax evasion and 
avoidance activities.
Previous studies often rely on tax-base proxies due to the absence of tax-base data. In this 
study, however, we use actual measures of tax bases. In our corporate-income-tax-base 
regression, the dependent variable is the log of the business income tax base. Similarly, in 
our sales-tax-base regression, the dependent variable is the log of general-sales-tax base. 
These tax bases are part of the administrative data that the federal government uses in its 
equalization-payments calculations. Further, we use reported personal taxable income as a 
measure of personal income tax base. Since the sizes of provinces vary greatly, we divide 
the tax bases by the province’s total population to make comparison across provinces 
possible. We also deflate the tax bases by the province’s respective GDP deflator in order to 
account for the effect of inflation. 
5Our key variables of interest are the provincial statutory tax rates. We rely on provincial 
statutory rates rather than the combined federal and provincial rates because our main 
interest is to estimate provincial-tax-base semi-elasticities. This approach also enables us 
to assess whether provincial and federal tax rates have differential effects on provincial tax 
bases. In our empirical analysis, the sales tax rate is the statutory provincial retail-sales-
tax rate. For those provinces that harmonized their sales taxes with the federal GST, on the 
other hand, we use the provincial component of the harmonized sales tax rate. During the 
period under consideration, as all provinces use progressive income tax systems, the choice 
of the provincial income tax rate for empirical analysis is not straightforward.23 Ideally, 
one would like to use a weighted average of the various tax rates applicable to the different 
tax brackets. This requires information on the number of taxpayers for the different tax 
brackets. As such a dataset is not readily available, following our previous study,24 we 
use the personal income tax rate that is applicable for the top income tax bracket. Some 
provinces during some years charge surtax on the top income earners. Thus, our top 
statutory provincial and federal personal income tax rates include all such applicable 
surtaxes.
Although our main interest is in estimating the semi-elasticity of tax bases with their 
own tax rates, as the different taxes are interrelated, a change in one tax rate may affect 
another tax base. This is particularly true between the corporate and personal income taxes. 
Thus, in our analysis we include all the three tax rates (CIT, PIT, and PST) as explanatory 
variables in each tax-base regression. This helps us assess the cross effects of tax rates on 
tax bases. For example we include sales- and income-tax rates in the corporate-tax-base 
regressions. There are various factors that may affect a province’s tax base other than its tax 
rates. Consequently, our sets of control variables include other provinces’ tax rates, federal 
tax rates and other macroeconomic variables that may have direct effects on the tax bases. 
We discuss these various control variables below.
The literature on tax competition suggests that a province’s tax base may be affected 
by the relevant tax rates in other jurisdictions. If the tax base is mobile (as is the case 
for corporate- and provincial-income-tax bases), the tax base may move from a high-
tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction. Differences in sales taxes between contiguous 
provinces may also encourage cross-border shopping. Thus, to account for these horizontal 
tax externalities, we include other provinces’ tax rates as control variables.25 We expect 
the other provinces’ tax rates to have positive effects on a tax base. In order to account 
for the presence of vertical tax externality in the Canadian federation, we also include the 
federal tax rate wherever applicable. More specifically, we include the federal CIT and the 
top marginal PIT rates in the corporate-tax-base and personal income tax-base regressions, 
respectively. We also include the federal goods and services tax (GST) in the sales-tax-base 
regression. As the provincial and federal governments co-occupy the same tax base, an 
increase in the federal tax rate is expected to have a negative effect on the tax base. Thus, 
we expect the coefficient of the federal tax rate to be negative in the provincial-tax-base 
regressions.
23 
Since 2001, Alberta has been using a flat personal income tax rate of 10 per cent.
24 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
25 
In the CIT-base regression, we use the weighted-average (weighted by population size) tax rate of all other provinces, but in 
the PIT- and PST-base regressions we use the weighted-average tax rate of contiguous neighbouring provinces.
6One would expect tax bases to be affected by various domestic and foreign macroeconomic 
shocks. To control for such effects, we also include various proxy variables for foreign and 
domestic shocks. As all provincial economies have their respective unique characteristics, 
they may face similar or different macroeconomic shocks. Thus the macroeconomic 
variables used to capture these shocks may well vary from one province to another.
2.2. Methodology 
The main goal of this paper is to estimate province-specific long-run tax-base elasticities 
and use them to compute provincial MCF. To this effect, as indicated before, we use time-
series analysis and provide empirical analysis for each province separately.26 In time-
series-based studies such as ours, co-integration techniques are commonly used to obtain 
long-run elasticities. However, to use this estimation method, one needs to first investigate 
the time-series properties of the various variables. A common empirical challenge in time-
series analysis is that if the variables are non-stationary, estimation of specifications such 
as Equation (1) with the commonly used ordinary least square (OLS) estimation method 
may provide spurious results. This is particularly true if the relevant variables do not have 
long-term relationships or are not co-integrated. For this reason, the first step in time-series 
analysis is to check for the order of integration of the various variables. 
In the literature, there are various kinds of unit-root tests. Previous studies commonly 
employ the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root test to check for the order of 
integration of time-series variables. The Phillips-Perron unit-root test is also another 
commonly used test to check whether a time-series variable possesses a unit root. However, 
these unit-root tests are also known to have serious limitations particularly in small 
samples. To overcome some of the shortcomings of these tests, Elliott, Rothenberg and 
Stock27 proposed an efficient unit-root test that modifies the familiar Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic using a generalized least squares (GLS) method (DF-GLS). They and other later 
studies show that this unit-root test (DF-GLS) is much better than all previous unit-root 
tests and has better performance and power in small-sample-size studies such as ours. 
Thus, in our analysis we employ this relatively powerful unit-root test in order to check 
whether the various variables of interest are non-stationary. Another advantage of the DF-
GLS unit-root test is that it automatically chooses the necessary lag length for unit-root 
tests. We choose the optimal lag length for the DF-GLS test using the method suggested by 
Ng and Perron.28
Our results suggest that all of the variables of interest, with the exception of the sales tax 
rate for British Columbia and Ontario, the corporate-income-tax base for New Brunswick 
and Prince Edward Island, and the personal income tax rate for Nova Scotia are non-
26 
An alternative empirical approach to obtain province-specific tax-base-elasticity estimates would be to use panel data 
analysis as in Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects,” and interact the tax rates with the provincial dummies. However, given the 
limited span of our data, such an approach would not be feasible. There will be no sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate 
the very many explanatory variables and their interaction terms in the model. For instance, interacting the three tax rates 
with the provincial dummies alone involves adding about 30 explanatory variables in the model.
27 
G. R. Elliott, T. J. Rothenberg and J. H. Stock, “Efficient tests for an autoregressive unit root,” Econometrica 64 (1996): 
813–836.
28 
S. Ng and P. Perron, “Unit root tests in ARMA models with data-dependent methods for the selection of the truncation lag,” 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (1995): 268–281.
7stationary or I(1). Although the DF-GLS test suggests that the corporate-income-tax base is 
stationary for New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, a closer look at the data indicates 
that this is due to the presence of a structural break in the data for the two provinces. It is 
generally well-known that in the presence of structural breaks, all unit-root tests perform 
very poorly and can be unreliable. Using a procedure suggested by Clemente, Montanes, 
and Reyes29 we conduct a unit-root test that would allow for structural breaks for the CIT 
base for the two provinces. We find that the corporate-income-tax base is indeed non-
stationary for the provinces and we treat this variable as non-stationary in our analysis. The 
unit-root tests are provided in Appendix 3. 
As the various variables of interest are non-stationary, estimation of Equation (1) by OLS 
may yield spurious results. The risk of spurious regression results from the direct estimation 
of Equation (1) by OLS can, however, be assuaged if the variables are co-integrated or 
have common trend. If the variables are co-integrated, it means that they have common 
stochastic trends and they move together in the long run. In the presence of co-integration, 
OLS estimation of Equation (1) reveals long-run relationships among the various relevant 
time-series variables. Thus, if the relevant variables in Equation (1) are co-integrated, the 
coefficient estimates will provide the long-run tax-base semi-elasticity estimates. Thus, 
empirically testing for the presence of co-integration relationships between the variables 
is important in time-series analysis. We conduct co-integration tests using the Johansen 
co-integration test procedure. We find that the various variables of interest are co-integrated 
for all provinces and the three relevant tax bases. The detailed results of the co-integration 
tests are given in Appendix 4.
It is known that if the variables are co-integrated, OLS coefficient estimates are consistent. 
However, OLS is not asymptotically normal and the usual inference using t- statistic 
cannot be used. Inference using OLS also becomes difficult if the explanatory variables 
are endogenous. Stock and Watson30 suggest augmenting the OLS regression with leads 
and lags of the first difference of the non-stationary explanatory variables. Stock and 
Watson31 show that including the first difference of the non-stationary variables in the 
regression solves the endogeneity problem. OLS estimation of the model that includes the 
first difference of the non-stationary variables and their leads and lags is called Dynamic 
OLS (DOLS) estimation.32 If the variables are co-integrated, coefficient estimates through 
DOLS are super consistent and statistical inference based on coefficients from such a 
regression and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are valid. In 
29 
J. Clemente, A. Montanes, and M. Reyes, “Testing for a Unit Root in Variables with a Double Change in the Mean,” 
Economics Letters, 59 (1998): 175-182.
30 
Stock and Watson, “A simple.”
31 ibid.
32 
DOLS estimation is based on a modified version of Equation (1) that includes past, present, and future values of  
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 , where the variables are as denoted before. Coefficient  
estimates obtained through DOLS are consistent, asymptotically normally distributed and efficient. Further, asymptotically 
there is no simultaneity bias in DOLS estimation. This is because the inclusion of the first-differenced variables 
asymptotically eliminates the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. See Bruce, Deskins and Fox, “On the Extent,” for a 
similar discussion. DOLS also deals with potential measurement error problems.
8fact, Monte Carlo studies such as Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sansó-i-Rosselló33 show that the 
DOLS estimator performs better than the Johansen method particularly in small samples 
such as ours as its finite sample properties are better. Previous studies such as Schaller,34 
Bruce, Deskins and Fox,35 and Wolswijk36 use DOLS to estimate elasticities. While DOLS 
estimates are super consistent if the non-stationary variables are co-integrated, the standard 
errors may not be useful as the problem of serial correlation still remains in the model. To 
address this, we rely on Newey-West serial correlation-robust standard errors. Note also that 
since the DOLS estimation controls for lagged and future values of changes in the tax rates, 
it also deals with the potential problem of endogeneity.
2.3. Data 
Our empirical specification is estimated using annual aggregate provincial time-series 
data for all the 10 Canadian provinces for the period 1972–2010. The data on statutory 
marginal tax rates are obtained from various issues of Finances of the Nation (formerly 
National Finances). The dataset on provincial taxable income is obtained from various 
issues of Income Statistics (formerly Tax Statistics on Individuals) published by the Canada 
Revenue Agency and it is an aggregate measure of the reported personal taxable income. 
As stated before, the business-income-tax and general-sales-tax bases are obtained from 
Finance Canada and they are the ones used by the federal government in its equalization-
payment allocations. A brief description of the data and definitions of the variables used 
in our empirical analysis is provided in Appendix 2. In Appendix 1 we present the key 
variables of interest for all the provinces. In addition to the average values for the study 
period, we indicate the corresponding values for the beginning and final year of the study 
period, and the last year for which we are going to compute the MCF. Over the period 
under consideration, there is a great deal of variation in real tax bases across provinces. As 
the main economic variables and the associated data are similar to those of our previous 
study,37 we keep our discussion brief here. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present and discuss the long-run tax-base semi-elasticity estimates 
obtained using the DOLS method. In DOLS estimation, the leads and lags of the 
differenced non-stationary variables are included as explanatory variables. In order to save 
degrees of freedom, given our relatively small sample size, we include up to two leads and 
lags whenever possible. Different length of lags and leads are used for the various 
33 
J.L. Carrion-i-Silvestre and A.S. Sansó-i-Rosselló, “Testing the Null of Cointegration with Structural Breaks,” Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 68 (2006), 623–646.
34 
Schaller, “Estimating.”
35 
Bruce, Deskins and Fox, “On the Extent.”
36 
G. Wolswijk, “Short-and long-run tax elasticities: the case of The Netherlands,” Working Paper No. 763 (European Central 
Bank, 2007).
37 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
9regressions as dictated by the relevant provincial data. As much as possible, the lag lengths 
are chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
TABLE 1 LONG-RUN TAX-BASE SEMI-ELASTICITY ESTIMATES, 1972–2010
Dependent Variables
CIT Base PIT Base PST Base
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CIT rate PIT rate PST rate CIT rate PIT rate PST rate CIT rate PIT rate PST rate
British Columbia 
(BC)
-15.24** 5.541 6.698 2.566*** -4.418*** 1.844* ---- ---- ----
(5.841) (5.562) (7.014) (0.387) (0.294) (0.771)
Alberta (AB) -13.10*** -0.284 ---- 3.19** -2.89** ---- ---- ---- ----
(5.239) (9.74) (1.212) (0.567)
Saskatchewan 
(SK)
-17.40** 1.204 1.880 -2.772 -3.859** 5.963 1.965 2.287* -5.794**
(6.981) (3.316) (13.13) (2.077) (1.489) (2.776) (2.843) (1.085) (2.341)
Manitoba (MB) -17.03*** 0.874 -22.22 0.946 -3.374** 0.798 2.496*** 0.00624 -3.646**
(4.915) (3.362) (21.16) (0.685) (1.356) (5.347) (0.531) (0.372) (1.500)
Ontario (ON) -13.00** 0.674 -30.81 2.234** -4.151*** -0.138 ---- ---- ----
(5.470) (3.269) (22.86) (0.940) (0.621) (3.173)
Quebec (QC) -6.078** 3.979 -22.19* 1.066 -2.616** 6.503 -1.048 0.493 -4.804**
(2.383) (5.315) (10.91) (1.423) (1.138) (4.646) (1.077) (0.998) (1.740)
New Brunswick 
(NB)
-17.56** 6.311 6.931 -0.728 -2.959** 3.010 -0.367 -0.0230 -3.698***
(8.247) (4.414) (6.146) (0.604) (1.200) (2.655) (0.860) (1.150) (0.847)
Nova Scotia 
(NS)
-10.99** -0.882 -17.40* ---- --- --- 3.257* 0.314 -3.810**
(4.931) (1.553) (8.494) (1.666) (0.472) (1.744)
Prince Edward 
Island (PE)
-15.46** -11.55 -18.61 5.656* -3.501** 9.585 1.264* 0.540 -5.900**
(6.322) (7.350) (12.02) (2.801) (1.277) (8.046) (0.699) (0.890) (2.809)
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
(NL)
-15.32** 4.948* -5.680 7.487 -4.033*** 2.811 6.114 0.0602 -4.512**
(0.726) (0.497) (1.276) (5.423) (1.049) (2.830) (5.622) (1.087) (2.079)
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, five per cent, and one per cent levels, respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficient estimates are obtained 
from separate province-by-province estimation of each tax base using the empirical specification of Equation (1) and 
including the lagged, present, and future values of the first difference of the non-stationary explanatory variables as 
suggested by the DOLS method.
In Table 1 we present the estimated long-run semi-elasticities of the tax bases with respect 
to the three tax rates. The coefficient estimates for tax rates and the other explanatory 
variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. Note also that the responsiveness of each 
of the three tax bases is estimated separately for all provinces.38 The reported standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust. We discuss the regression results 
for the three tax bases separately below.
38 
The detailed province-by-province regression results are available from the authors upon request.
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3.1. Corporate income tax
Column (1) shows the long-run own semi-elasticity for the corporate-income-tax base, 
while the cross effects of personal income and sales-tax rates on the corporate-income-tax 
base are shown in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Note also that the CIT-base regressions, 
in addition to the three tax rates, include lagged, present and future values of the change 
in the tax rates, and other control variables that are deemed to have an influence on 
corporate-income-tax bases. As explained before, these additional explanatory variables 
control for such factors as external economic shocks, horizontal tax competition, vertical 
tax competition and other province-specific corporate-income-tax-base shocks. Whenever 
necessary, we try using dummy variables to account for provincial corporate-income-tax-
base shocks, which commonly manifest themselves in the form of sharp falls or jumps in 
the tax base. However, the coefficients of these variables are not reported in Table 1 for the 
sake of brevity. 
As explained before, we expect an increase in the corporate-income-tax rate to have a 
negative effect on the corporate-income-tax base due to possible tax-avoidance and evasion 
activities associated with higher corporate income tax. That is, we expect the long-run own 
semi-elasticity coefficients to be negative. As column (1) shows, for all provinces, we find 
a statistically significant negative own semi-elasticity estimate for the corporate-income-
tax base. The numerical magnitudes of the coefficient estimates vary across provinces. 
The own semi-elasticity estimates range from about –6.08 for Quebec to –17.56 for New 
Brunswick. 
In Figure 1, we plot the (absolute value of) the semi-elasticities of the CIT base with respect 
to the provinces’ own CIT rate versus the provinces’ population. The figure indicates that 
the CIT base is generally more tax sensitive in the smaller provinces than in the larger 
provinces, which is an implication of some models of tax competition such as Kanbur 
and Keen.39 An exceptionally low semi-elasticity was estimated for Quebec, where a one-
percentage-point increase in that province’s CIT rate is associated with a 6.1 per cent 
reduction in its corporate-income-tax base in the long run, which is 53 per cent lower than 
the semi-elasticity in Ontario, the largest province. Quebec’s unique cultural and linguistic 
characteristics, and perhaps some of the province’s regulatory policies, may make corporate 
capital investment less sensitive to the tax policy than in other provinces. In addition, until 
very recently, Quebec had, by far, the lowest corporate-income-tax rate in the country and 
this may partly explain the low tax-base sensitivity that we find in this paper. Finally, note 
that, although we expect other tax rates to have an effect on the corporate-income-tax base, 
we do not find strong statistically significant cross effects of PIT rate and PST rate on the 
corporate-income-tax base. Our previous study40 also reported similar qualitative results. 
39 
Kanbur and Keen, “Jeux Sans.”
40 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
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FIGURE 1 THE LONG-RUN SEMI-ELASTICITY OF THE CIT BASE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVINCIAL CIT RATE
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3.2. Personal income tax
The estimated long-run responsiveness of the PIT base with respect to the personal, 
corporate and sales tax rates are shown in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 1, respectively. 
Since the personal income tax rate is stationary for Nova Scotia, we do not report the semi-
elasticity estimates of the personal income tax base with respect to the tax rates for the 
province. As in the corporate-income-tax-base regression, we also include here all relevant 
control variables to account for external shocks and horizontal and vertical tax competition. 
It is also important to note that the federal government’s tax reform of 1988 expanded the 
personal income tax base of all provinces significantly as provinces use a definition of 
the personal income tax base that is consistent with that of the federal government. This 
common shock to all provinces is captured by including a dummy variable that is equal to 
one after the tax reform, and zero otherwise, in all personal income tax-base regressions. 
Whenever the need arises, we also account for other province-specific shocks to the 
personal income tax base. 
The long-run own semi-elasticity estimates for the personal income tax base, as expected, 
are negative and statistically significant at the five per cent level or better for all the 
provinces. We also find statistically significant positive effects of the CIT rate on the 
personal income tax base for British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. These results imply 
that a higher CIT rate means that entrepreneurs may be reporting more income as personal 
income and less as corporate income when the corporate tax rate increases. The PST rate, 
12
on the other hand, seems to have no statistically significant effects on the personal income 
tax base. The own semi-elasticity estimate for the personal income tax base ranges from 
about –2.62 for Quebec to –4.42 for British Columbia. The low responsiveness of the 
Quebec PIT base with respect to the province’s PIT rate may reflect the unique linguistic 
and cultural characteristics, which may make the PIT base less responsive because of 
lower population mobility than in other provinces. It may also help to explain why Quebec 
has been able to maintain very high personal income tax rate in the Canadian and North 
American context. 41 See for example Finnie42 and Saez and Veall.43 
3.3. General sales tax
The sales-tax-base regression results are reported in columns (7) through (9) in Table 1 
above. Since we find that sales tax rates are stationary for British Columbia and Ontario, we 
do not present sales-tax-base semi-elasticity estimates with respect to the sales tax rate for 
these provinces. This is because co-integration, or long-term relationship, is infeasible if the 
explanatory variable is stationary. Finally, Alberta does not impose a sales tax and as such 
there is no sales-tax-base regression for the province.
The estimated long-run sales-tax-base own semi-elasticity estimates are shown in column 
(9) of Table 1. As expected, the own semi-elasticity estimates are negative and statistically 
significant at the five per cent level or better for all the provinces. The coefficient estimates 
range from about –3.65 for Manitoba to –5.90 for Prince Edward Island. We also find 
a very high coefficient estimate for Saskatchewan. One may be surprised by the high 
responsiveness of Saskatchewan’s sales tax base with respect to the sales tax rate given 
that the province has had the lowest sales tax rate in the federation during the period under 
consideration. But the high sensitivity of the sales tax base in Saskatchewan might be 
explained by the absence of a general sales tax in the neighbouring province of Alberta.
One may expect a higher personal income tax rate that reduces the after-tax income of 
individuals to have a negative effect on the sales tax base. Contrary to our expectation, the 
personal income tax rate is not statistically significant in the sales-tax-base regression for 
any of the provinces. Similarly, we do not find a statistically significant effect of corporate-
income-tax rate on the sales tax base. The only exception is for Manitoba where we find 
the unexpected positive effect of the CIT rate on the sales tax base. Again, these qualitative 
results are generally consistent with those reported in our 2012 study.44
For ease of comparison, Figure 2 presents the (absolute values of) the own-tax semi-
elasticities for the three tax bases in all of the provinces. The figure indicates that the 
CIT base has much higher tax rate sensitivity than do the tax rate sensitivities of the PIT 
and PST bases. This result is consistent with most economists’ views about the relative 
sensitivity of these tax bases. Perhaps more surprising is that the magnitude of own-
41 
Quebec residents receive a refundable tax abatement of 16.5 per cent of basic federal tax in calculating their federal-tax 
payables. We explicitly control for this effect for Quebec in our regression.
42 
Finnie, “Who Moves?”
43 
Saez and Veall, “The Evolution.”
44 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
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tax semi-elasticities of the PST and PIT do not exhibit significant differences in many 
provinces. Results in our previous study,45 on the other hand, indicated that the PST base 
was less sensitive to tax rate changes than is the PIT base.
FIGURE 2 THE SEMI-ELASTICITIES OF THE TAX BASES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR OWN TAX RATES
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4. COMPUTING THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS
4.1. Analytical framework
As indicated previously, our main objective is to compute MCF for the CIT, PIT, and PST 
using the province-specific tax-base-elasticity estimates. The analytical framework for the 
MCF computations is the same as that used in our 2012 study.46 In this section, we describe 
the computation of the MCF using estimates of tax-base semi-elasticities as presented in 
Table 1. As indicated below, in addition to tax-base semi-elasticity estimates, we need 
information on provincial governments’ tax rates and the tax bases’ shares of tax revenues 
to estimate the MCF.
Suppose we denote tax base j by Bj . We assume that the tax base depends on the three tax 
rates: corporate, personal, and sales. The tax-base function can formally be specified as:
  ,,, spcjj BB   (2)
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
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where j = c, p, s denotes the corporate-income-tax (c), personal income tax (p), and sales-
tax (s) bases, respectively. For the different tax-revenue sources, a government’s tax revenue 
depends on the tax base and its respective tax rates. Thus, the total tax revenue (TR) from 
the three tax-revenue categories under consideration will be simply the sum of the product 
of each tax base with its respective tax rate. That is, a government’s total tax revenue from 
the three tax bases is given by:
 .
j
jj BTR   (3)
As we have indicated before, a tax base depends on all the three tax rates. Thus, a change in 
a particular tax rate can affect the total tax revenue of the government directly, through the 
tax base related to the particular tax rate, and indirectly, through the other tax bases. Thus, 
the total effect of a change in any particular tax rate on the total provincial tax revenue is 
given by:
 , 
j j
jiji
i
j
ji
i
RB
d
dB
B
d
dTR




 (4)
where Rj = τjBj is the revenue raised from tax base j and  ijji dBd  /)ln(  is the semi-
elasticity of tax base j with respect to tax rate i. 
It is well-known that an increase in a tax rate may induce tax-avoidance and tax-evasion 
activities, ultimately reducing the tax base associated with the particular tax rate. Thus we 
expect the own-base semi-elasticity, εjj, to be negative. However, the sign of the cross-base 
semi-elasticity, εji, cannot be determined a priori. If an increase in the tax rate associated 
with tax base i causes taxpayers to shift their activities to tax base j to avoid the tax rate 
increase on tax base i, we expect the sign of the cross-base elasticity to be positive. On the 
other hand, if the two tax bases are complementary, an increase in a tax rate can reduce 
both tax bases and the cross-base semi-elasticity would be negative. The responsiveness of 
total tax revenue to changes in a particular tax rate i can be computed as: 
 

j
jijii
i
i
i ssd
dTR
TR



  (5)
where  TRRs ii / is the share of total tax revenue from tax base i and all the other 
variables are as defined before. Equation (5) shows the elasticity of total tax revenue with 
respect to the tax rate on tax base i. Note that this tax-revenue-elasticity measure (ρi) 
depends on the own-base semi-elasticity associated with the tax rate and on the weighted 
average (weighted by tax-revenue shares) semi-elasticity of other tax bases with respect to 
that tax rate. 
Our ultimate objective in this paper is to compute provincial MCF for the three major 
taxes. We discuss tax-base and tax-revenue elasticities because, as we show below, the 
tax-revenue-elasticity estimates are important ingredients in the computation of the MCF. 
As discussed in Dahlby47 in more detail, when governments raise their tax rates there are 
both direct and indirect costs to society. When a government increases a tax rate associated 
with a particular tax base, the direct cost to taxpayers is the additional revenue it generates. 
47 
Bev Dahlby, The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Theory and Applications (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008). 
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However, the cost of tax rate increases is not limited to this direct cost. Tax rate changes 
induce changes in economic decisions of taxpayers, which ultimately may reduce the 
welfare of society. The MCF is a measure of the loss created by the additional distortion in 
the allocation of resources when governments try to raise an additional dollar of tax revenue 
through an increase in the tax rate. If we assume that there are no other non-tax distortions 
in the economy (such as environmental externalities or involuntary unemployment), the 
MCF for a tax rate increase on tax base i is given by:48
 .
i
i
i
i
ii
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
   (6)
Plugging Equation (5) into Equation (6) and rearranging one obtains the following formula 
for the MCF:
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  (7)
where  
j
jiji s   and all the other variables are as defined before. According to Equation 
(7), for any particular tax base, the MCF depends on its own semi-elasticity, the tax rate, 
and the weighted average of other tax bases’ semi-elasticity with respect to the tax rate 
(weighted by their revenue shares). If the denominator in Equation (7) is negative—which 
occurs if the elasticity estimates are very large in absolute value—then it shows that the 
government is on the downward-sloping part of the long-run total revenue Laffer curve. In 
this case, governments can actually raise more tax revenue by cutting the tax rate and hence 
the MCF is not well defined. In the following section, we use the province-specific tax-base 
semi-elasticity estimates reported in Table 1 in conjunction with provincial tax rates and 
tax-revenue shares to compute the MCF for the three tax bases. In all cases, since we are 
interested in the long-run impact of tax rate changes, we define the MCF in terms of the 
changes in the long-run total tax revenues.
4.2. Computations of the MCF
Table 2 shows our calculations of the MCF for 2013. Note that we cannot compute the MCF 
for the sales tax base for British Columbia and Ontario because we do not have estimates 
of the own semi-elasticities for the sales tax bases for those provinces. For the same reason, 
we cannot compute the MCF for the personal income tax for Nova Scotia. The MCF for 
sales tax for Alberta is reported as 1.00 since the province’s sales tax rate is zero. 
48 
On the welfare foundations of the MCF, see Dahlby (ibid., chapters 2 and 3) and Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, “The Elasticity.”
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TABLE 2 THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, 2013
 
 
Marginal Cost of Public Funds
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax General Sales Tax
British Columbia 3.19 2.86 ---
Alberta 2.91 1.41 1.00
Saskatchewan *** 2.38 1.41
Manitoba 4. 70 2.42 1.34
Ontario 5.21 6.76 ---
Quebec 3.62 3.05 1.92
New Brunswick *** 1.91 1.42
Nova Scotia *** --- 1.62
Prince Edward Island *** 2.80 2.44
Newfoundland and Labrador *** 2.16 1.57
Note: *** indicates that a tax rate increase would reduce the long-run total tax revenues.
--- indicates that the MCF could not be computed because the own semi-elasticity could not be estimated.
The MCF for provincial corporate income tax in 2013 are reported in column (1) of Table 
2.49 The MCF was not computed for Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador because the computations indicated that 
these provinces were on the downward-sloping sections of their long-run total revenue 
Laffer curves — i.e., a reduction in their CIT rates would increase their long-run total tax 
revenues. For the other provinces, the MCF for the CIT range from about 2.91 for Alberta 
to 5.21 for Ontario. The low MCF for Alberta is in marked contrast with the results in our 
2012 study,50 a point that we will return to later. Column (2) of Table 2 show that the MCF 
for PIT ranges from 1.41 for Alberta to 6.76 for Ontario. The low MCF for Alberta may 
be explained by the fact that the province has had the lowest top personal income tax rate 
in the federation since 2001. For year 2013, Quebec has the second-highest MCF for PIT 
even though the estimated tax-base own semi-elasticity estimates are (in absolute value) the 
lowest in the country. This may be due to the fact that the province has the highest statutory 
top personal income tax rate in the country. Note also that, with the exception of Ontario, 
the CIT has the highest MCF and the PST has the lowest MCF. The reversal of ranking for 
Ontario may be partly explained due to the significant increase in the province’s statutory 
top personal income tax rate in the year. Our previous study also found similar results.51 
The results of Table 2 provide MCF estimates only for one year and one may wonder how 
the computed MCF evolve over time. For three of the largest provinces in the federation— 
Alberta, Ontario and Quebec—we have computed the MCF for each year over the last three 
decades. The three provinces together accounted for about 75 per cent of the Canadian 
economy in 2013. 
49 
We compute and discuss provincial MCF estimates for year 2013, the last year for which we have complete data on tax rates 
and revenue shares. The computed MCF are based on the tax-base-elasticity estimates reported in Table 1 and the tax rates 
and revenue shares of year 2013. However, for comparison purposes, we also present the computed provincial MCF for year 
2010, the last year of our sample period, in Appendix 5.
50 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
51 ibid.
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Figure 3 shows that the estimated MCF for the CIT for Alberta have fluctuated a greater 
deal over the last 30 years, while the MCF for PIT have declined with the reduction in the 
personal income tax rates in 2000, and then remained constant. 
FIGURE 3 THE MCF FOR PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX, ALBERTA, 1984–2013
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The primary reason for these fluctuations is that the corporate-income-tax base is very 
volatile, which affects its revenue share and the calculation of the MCF for the CIT.52 Note 
also that the MCF for PIT for the province was higher than the corresponding value for the 
CIT between 1989 and 2001. After the year 2001, the MCF of CIT has been continuously 
higher than the MCF for PIT. The reason for this reversal in ranking in the province’s MCF 
is due to the personal income tax reform in the province that lowered the statutory tax rate 
and instituted a flat income tax rate of 10 per cent.
One of the most significant differences between the estimates of the MCF in our 2012 
study53 and the current calculations, which are based on the province-specific semi-
elasticities, is that the MCF for the CIT in Alberta is now much lower. For example, our 
estimate of the MCF for the CIT for Alberta in 2006 was 30.60 in our 2012 paper, and it 
is now 2.91. The main reason for the reduction in the estimate of the MCF for the CIT is 
that we now have a much higher estimate of the effect of a CIT-rate increase on the PIT 
base—3.19 now versus 1.101 in our 2012 paper. Even though our estimate of the own tax 
semi-elasticity for the CIT base in Alberta is larger (in absolute value) — –13.10 versus 
–12.034 — the higher value for the cross-elasticity substantially reduces the MCF for the 
CIT in Alberta. Intuitively, the higher cross elasticity implies that an increase in the CIT 
rate, by increasing the PIT base, results in additional tax revenues from a CIT-rate increase 
52 
It should be indicated that, given the semi-elasticity estimates, changes in the MCF are due to changes in tax rates and/
or tax-revenue shares. The contribution of the latter on the MCF is due to the nature of the functional form used in our 
empirical analysis. 
53 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects,” Table 6A.
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and therefore a lower MCF for the CIT. These results indicate the importance of capturing 
the interactions between the tax bases in analyzing tax-policy changes.
FIGURE 4 THE MCF FOR PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX, QUEBEC, 1984–2013
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The computed MCF for CIT and PIT for Quebec over the last three decades are shown in 
Figure 4. The MCF for PIT has been higher than the MCF for CIT for most of the period 
under consideration. This is not surprising because, historically, Quebec has had the highest 
PIT rate and the lowest CIT rate in the country. However, there occurred a reversal of the 
province’s MCF ranking in year 2008. This reversal in ranking was due to the increase in 
the province’s CIT rate from 9.9 per cent in 2007, which was the lowest in the country at 
the time, to 11.4 per cent in 2008. As there were no significant changes in the tax-revenue 
shares and PIT rates, such increase in the CIT rate resulted in a significant increase in the 
MCF for CIT. 
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FIGURE 5 THE MCF FOR PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX, ONTARIO, 1984–2013
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Ontario is the largest province in the country. It accounts for about 37 per cent of Canada’s 
GDP and 39 per cent of the total Canadian population in 2013. So it is important to look at 
how the social cost of raising tax revenues has evolved over time in this province. Figure 
5 above presents the MCF for PIT and MCF for CIT for the province for the last three 
decades. Both MCF estimates show a great deal of variation during the period. And, as is 
the case in other provinces, the MCF for the CIT shows more fluctuations than the MCF for 
PIT. The MCF exhibits significant swings over time mainly due to changes in the provincial 
CIT revenue shares. The MCF for CIT was relatively low prior to 1998, then it spiked to 
over 20 in 2000, and then declined to 3.71 in 2003. From 2004 to 2010, it ranged between 
5.28 and 10.91. In 2011, the province cut its CIT rate from 14 per cent to 11.5 per cent. This 
reduction in the CIT rate reduced the province’s MCF for CIT to 3.39, below the MCF for 
PIT. In addition, in the following two years, the province raised the PIT rate, which resulted 
in a further increase in the MCF for PIT above the MCF for CIT. Thus, the exception in the 
provincial ranking of MCF for Ontario that we indicated in Table 2 is a recent phenomenon 
caused by the recent PIT-rate increase. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The revenue and economic effects of tax-policy reforms crucially depend on the 
responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate changes. A higher tax-base-elasticity estimate 
implies that tax rate changes will have significant effects on the tax base, implying a greater 
distortion in the allocation of resources in the economy and ultimately a higher efficiency 
cost from tax rate increases. Consequently, tax-base-elasticity estimates are key parameters 
in many tax-policy analyses and discussions. While a number of previous studies 
investigate the responsiveness of taxable income to tax rate changes based on individual 
tax-returns data, there is generally a paucity of empirical studies that provide empirical 
20
estimates of these important variables for corporate income tax or a general sales tax. 
Due to the nature of their investigations, previous studies also largely ignore the possible 
interaction of the various tax rates. Further, there are only very limited studies that focus on 
the estimation of tax-base-elasticity estimates for Canada.
In this paper, we estimate the long-run responsiveness of Canadian provincial tax bases to 
tax rate changes by explicitly controlling for the possible interactions between tax rates. 
While our previous paper54 provides tax-base-elasticity estimates that are the same for all 
provinces, one would expect tax-base-elasticity estimates to differ across provinces due to 
various province-specific characteristics that change over time. We use annual time-series 
data from Canadian provinces over the period 1972–2010 and focus on the three major tax 
rates: corporate income, personal income and sales tax. Such an empirical methodology 
enables us to provide province-specific long-run tax-base-elasticity estimates associated 
with the three major taxes imposed by the Canadian provinces. Our results indicate that 
the corporate-income-tax base generally is the most responsive to tax rate changes. The 
estimated corporate-income-tax-base own semi-elasticity estimates range from –6.08 for 
Quebec to –17.56 for New Brunswick. The own semi-elasticity estimate for the personal 
income tax base also varies from –2.62 for Quebec to –4.42 for British Columbia. Our 
econometric results also indicate that small provinces have more tax-sensitive corporate-
income-tax bases. The exception is Quebec where the tax responsiveness of both the 
corporate- and personal income tax bases are relatively low, perhaps because of its unique 
Francophone culture and historically low corporate-income-tax environment. Due to the 
nature of data, we could only obtain general-sales-tax-base own semi-elasticity estimates 
for seven provinces, and those range from about –3.65 for Manitoba to –5.90 for Prince 
Edward Island. 
We also use the province-specific long-run tax-base semi-elasticity estimates along with 
provincial tax rates and tax-revenue shares to compute the MCF for the three taxes for all 
provinces. The results suggest that there has been a significant variation in the MCF during 
the period under investigation due to changes in tax rates and tax-revenue shares. We find 
that corporate and personal income taxes have higher MCF than does sales tax. Our results 
also indicate that, in 2013, the MCF for corporate income tax was the highest and the 
MCF for sales tax was the lowest for all provinces except Ontario. For Ontario, MCF for 
personal income tax was higher than MCF for corporate income tax. The MCF estimates 
for corporate income tax range from 2.91 for Alberta to 5.21 for Ontario in 2013. 
An important policy implication of our findings is that raising tax revenue with corporate-
income-tax rate increases by provincial governments has the highest economic cost to 
society. In fact, the results suggest that there would have been welfare gains in 2013 from a 
reduction in the CIT rate with a revenue-neutral switch to higher sales tax rates in British 
Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. A CIT-rate reduction would have 
increased tax revenue in the Atlantic provinces and Saskatchewan and, as a result, would 
not have required a compensating increase in sales tax rates. 
54 
Dahlby and Ferede, “The effects.”
21
Our results also have important implications for tax-policy analysis in other federations. As 
tax-base responsiveness to tax rate changes seem to vary across subnational governments, 
one should be cautious when relying on unique elasticity estimates that are common for all 
jurisdictions in the federation in tax-policy discussions.
It is important to indicate some of the limitations of our study. First, while tax-policy 
discussions and debates usually focus on the long-run effects of tax rate changes, policy-
makers with a short time-planning horizon may be interested in the short-run responses 
of tax bases and tax revenue to changes in tax rates. However, we do not provide short-run 
tax-base elasticity and MCF estimates in this paper. Further, our computation of long-run 
MCF and attempts to measure the social cost of tax rate increases ignores the possible 
distributional effects of tax rate changes. Although we explicitly account for possible 
horizontal and vertical tax competition, our analysis assumes that the burden of any tax rate 
increase will be entirely borne by residents in the province. The above issues are beyond the 
scope of the study and are important limitations that can be addressed in future research to 
enrich tax-policy discussions in Canada.
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APPENDIX 1: PROFILE OF CANADIAN PROVINCES, 1972–2010
NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC
Average real tax base per capita
(2002 Canadian dollars)
Corporate 
income tax
1,451 1,552 1,725 1,671 3,055 3,777 2,117 2,289 5,393 2,665
Personal 
income tax
9,494 10,789 12,133 11,062 13,145 16,307 12,535 11,498 15,556 15,542
Sales taxa 8,125 8,733 9,449 9,016 9,536 10,879 9,113 9,391 13,598 11,537
Average tax-revenue shares, 1972–2010
(%)
Corporate 
income tax
9.69 7.69 8.88 8.80 8.48 15.02 10.25 13.34 30.62 12.47
Personal 
income tax
43.81 46.61 52.71 49.30 65.12 51.40 55.91 56.75 69.38 52.21
Sales tax 46.50 45.70 38.41 41.90 26.40 33.57 33.84 29.90 0.00 35.32
Provincial statutory CIT rate
(%)
1972 13.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 13.00 12.00 11.00 13.00
2010 14.00 16.00 16.00 11.00 11.90 14.00 12.00 12.00 10.00 10.50
2013 14.00 16.00 16.00 10.00 11.90 11.50 12.00 12.00 10.00 10.00
1972–2010 14.71 13.44 14.62 14.10 9.30 14.24 15.51 15.03 12.55 14.58
Provincial statutory top marginal PIT rate
(%)b
1972 16.92 16.92 18.10 19.51 28.00 14.03 19.98 18.80 16.92 14.34
2010 15.50 18.37 19.25 14.30 24.00 17.41 17.40 15.00 10.00 14.70
2013 13.30 18.37 21.00 16.07 25.75 20.53 17.40 15.00 10.00 14.70
1972–2010 20.00 18.64 19.30 19.21 27.17 17.68 18.83 18.32 13.59 17.41
Provincial general-sales-tax rate
(%)
1972 7.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00
2010 8.00 10.50 8.00 8.00 7.88 8.00 7.00 5.00 0.00 7.00
2013 8.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 9.98 8.00 7.00 5.00 0.00 7.00
1972–2010 10.00 9.90 8.82 9.09 8.08 7.49 6.36 6.15 0.00 6.40
Notes:
a This is only for the period 1977–2010.
b  The PIT rates include applicable surtaxes; note that Quebec residents also receive a refundable tax abatement of 16.5 per 
cent of basic federal tax, which reduces their federal tax liability.
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APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS OF KEY VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Variable Description Source
Corporate-income-tax base (CITbase) Business-tax base used in equalization-payment 
calculations
Finance Canada
Personal income tax base (PITbase) Personal taxable income Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics (formerly 
Tax Statistics on Individuals) 
General-sales-tax base (PSTbase) Provincial general and miscellaneous sales tax base 
used in equalization-payment calculations
Finance Canada
Corporate marginal tax rate (CITprov) Provincial statutory top marginal corporate-income-
tax rate (general rate)
Finances of the Nation (formerly National Finances)
Top personal marginal tax rate (PITprov) Provincial-income-tax rate of the top income bracket Finances of the Nation (formerly National Finances)
Sales tax rate (PSTprov) Provincial-sales-tax rate (PST) Finances of the Nation (formerly National Finances)
Federal CIT rate (CITfed) Federal government corporate-income-tax rate Finances of the Nation (formerly National Finances)
Federal PIT rate (PITfed) Federal government top personal income tax rate Finances of the Nation (formerly National Finances)
Population Total provincial population Statistics Canada, CANSIM table 051-0001
GDP deflator Gross domestic product, implicit price index  
(2002 = 100)
Statistics Canada, Provincial Economic Accounts
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APPENDIX 3: DF-GLS UNIT-ROOT TESTS OF KEY VARIABLES IN LEVELS 
 Levels NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC
Log of 
CITbase
-1.810 -3.978** -2.365 -4.368** -2.285 -2.610 -1.509 -2.688 -2.870 -2.860
Log of 
PITbase
-1.659 -1.677 -1.849 -1.837 -1.917 -2.018 -1.702 -1.545 -1.498 -1.966
Log of 
PSTbase
-2.602 -1.003  2.825 -1.903 -2.162 -2.118 -2.665 -2.185 -1.960 -2.255
CITprov -1.899 -1.959 -1.528 -2.111 -1.872 -1.267 -2.198 -0.868 -1.365 -1.736
PITprov -2.495 -2.735 -3.877** -2.188 -1.484 -1.933  -2.460 -2.583 -1.282 -1.627
PSTprov -1.494 -1.066 -1.756 -1.309 -1.793 -4.199** -1.875 -1.488 ----- -4.359**
CITfed -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999 -1.999
PITfed -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679 -1.679
Notes:
**denote statistical significance at the five per cent level or better and we reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that the variable is non-stationary or I (1). In each case, optimal lag length is chosen according to Ng criterion. For PE and NB, 
the unit-root tests show that the CIT base is stationary due to the presence of a structural break. Once the structural break is 
addressed (in parentheses), the variable is non-stationary. The GST variable seems to be stationary once structural break is 
taken into account and it is treated as such in our analysis.
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APPENDIX 4: JOHANSEN CO-INTEGRATION TEST 
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax General Sales Tax
Trace statistic under 
Ho: r = 0
5%  
Critical value 
Trace statistic under 
Ho: r = 0
5%  
Critical value 
Trace statistic under 
Ho: r = 0
5%  
Critical value 
British Columbia 293.3** 192.9 533.2** 277.7 --- ---
Alberta 267.0** 192.9 376.1** 192.9 --- ---
Saskatchewan 230.1** 156.0 269.4** 156.0 854.0** 277.7
Manitoba 249.7** 156.0 472.5** 277.7 508.4** 233.1
Ontario 274.0** 156.0 633.1** 277.7 --- ---
Quebec 326.2** 192.9 254.9** 192.9 464.8** 192.9
New Brunswick 288.1** 192.9 451.7** 233.1 272.5** 192.9
Nova Scotia 345.9** 192.9 --- ---- 413.7** 192.9
Prince Edward Island 266.5** 233.1 478.0** 233.1 594.8** 192.9
Newfoundland  
and Labrador 550.0** 233.1 333.3** 233.1 329.1** 192.9
Notes:
We report the Johansen trace statistic for the null hypothesis (Ho) of no-co-integration and the associated five per cent 
critical values. We use two lags for the co-integration tests. ** denotes that the hypothesis of no-co-integration is rejected at 
the five per cent significance level.
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APPENDIX 5: THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS  
FOR THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, 2010
Marginal Cost of Public Funds
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax General Sales Tax
British Columbia 3.37 2.86 ---
Alberta 3.02 1.41 1.00
Saskatchewan *** 2.38 1.40
Manitoba 3.40 2.42 1.34
Ontario 5.47 3.60 ---
Quebec 3.62 2.68 1.61
New Brunswick *** 1.73 1.42
Nova Scotia *** --- 1.44
Prince Edward Island *** 2.80 2.63
Newfoundland and Labrador *** 2.66 1.50
Notes:
*** indicates that a tax rate increase would reduce the long-run total tax revenues.
--- indicates that the MCF could not be computed because the own semi-elasticity could not be estimated. 
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